Abstract-This paper studies the secure transmission rate issue between sensors and the remote controller to defend the jamming and eavesdropping attacks in green cyber-physical transportation systems. In this system, the traffic sensor transmits the transportation state information to the remote controller via wireless networks. Due to the broadcast characteristics of the wireless communication, the systems are vulnerable to the eavesdropping and jamming attacks. In this paper, we study how to maximize the secure transmission rate between sensors and the controller in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper and a jammer. Specifically, the malicious jammer is smart and can choose the optimal power strategy to maximize the side effect with the knowledge of sensor's transmission power. For the purpose of achieving the maximum utility, the optimal strategy is determined via adjusting the sensor's transmission power according to the control feedback L. Yuan is with the National Engineering Research Center of Communications and Networking, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China (e-mail: xzsnyli@gmail.com).
I. INTRODUCTION
C YBER-PHYSICAL systems (CPS) combine the capabilities of sensing, control, communication, and computing together, and are widely employed in various applications such as aviation, national defense, armamentarium, and industrial automation. In CPS, sensors receive the control commands from the remote controller and respond with the sensing information through an open and wireless communication media. Considering the wireless property of CPS, information communication between sensors and the controller is under the threat of eavesdropping and jamming attacks. For example, the future intelligent transportation [1] denoted as a cyber-physical transportation system (CPTS) is widely used to manage the transportation situation for vehicles, trains, and aeroplanes. In this system, the transportation condition information is mainly transmitted in the public network with open network architecture. It is obvious that the transmission process is vulnerable to security risks, such as stealing, falsifying, and interfering the transportation state information.
Any malicious attacks on the transmission process may result in wrong judgment and impact on the transportation condition or even the traffic accident. Therefore, the secure information transmission is an important issue in CPTS [2] - [5] .
Eavesdropping is a popular attack in wireless networks. A plenty of encryption-based approaches are proposed [6] . Without the correct keys shared among the sensors and controller, the malicious eavesdropper does not know what is transmitted between the sensors and controller even if it has obtained the encrypted data packets. However, the employment of encryption needs much computing power, which is seriously limited due to the small size of the sensors' batteries. Moreover, we have to allocate much computing power of sensors to the operations of analyzing the transportation state information. Therefore, the power-consuming encryption-based approach is not a proper countermeasure to the eavesdropping attacks in CPTS. The physical layer security techniques that do not require any computing power have attracted much attention from both academia and industry. In [7] - [10] , the concept of a friendly jammer was proposed to prevent the eavesdropping attacks from intentionally injecting noise in CPTS. In recent years, almost all previous literatures assumed that the jammer is friendly, i.e., the users have the full right to control it. However, in reality, the jammer is not always friendly and may perform a malicious role to transmit noise to disturb the normal information transmission. Since the malicious jammer can substitute the friendly jammer and reduce the power consumption of the whole CPTS, this system may achieve green and we call it green cyber-physical transportation systems (GCPTS) [11] - [13] .
In this paper, we study the eavesdropping defense with the jamming attacks shown in Fig. 1 . The modeled system consists of four components, namely, traffic sensors, a remote controller, a malicious jammer, and a malicious eavesdropper. Since the jammer injects noise in GCPTS via a broadcast manner, it can not only interfere with the transmission between sensors and the controller but also prevent from the eavesdropping attacks to some extent. This paper investigates how to maximize the secure transmission rate in the presence of a malicious jammer and how to make the interference of the jammer to the eavesdropper reach a specific level. With the malicious jammer, source power can be reduced while achieving the same secrecy capacity. In addition, we do not need the power of a friendly jammer that exists in previous methods. We have established two types of communication processes: First, a single-antenna sensor, where the information is transmitted in one channel, and second, a multiantenna sensor, where the information is divided into multiple packets to be transmitted at multiple channels.
We model the power allocation problem as a Stackelberg game [14] , in which the sensor is the leader and the jammer is the follower. Both of them intend to maximize their own utilities. We apply this game to a novel CPTS model. This paper takes the eavesdroppers into consideration and studies how to maximize the secure transmission rate between sensors and the controller in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper and a jammer. In our approach, the jammers are used to defend against the malicious eavesdroppers.
There are three contributions in this paper. 1) We consider the transmission security of the transportation state information in GCPTS, and the corresponding process is different from the traditional wireless transmission with assistance of feedback. By the control feedback, the traffic sensors do not need to allot any computing power to solve the power allocation problem. Moreover, in traditional wireless communications, the sender does not consider the state of the receiver when determining the transmission strategy. It may cause nonoptimal strategy choice. On the contrary, the sensors in GCPTS are able to dynamically adjust the communication strategy to achieve the optimization according to the feedback signal from the remote controller. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first piece of work that uses the control feedback to enhance the security of the transmission process in GCPTS. 2) Most previous works have proposed to use the friendly jammer to improve the security of a transmission process. This is effective but not practical because the jammer is not always friendly and more likely to be a malicious jammer that tries to maximize the side effect to GCPTS. In the GCPTS with both eavesdropping and jamming attacks, the objectives of these two attackers are different. Specifically, the eavesdropping attacker intends to wiretap the transmission content between sensors and the controller, whereas the jammer intends to corrupt the transmission between sensors and the controller. Due to the coexistence of jamming and eavesdropping attackers, the eavesdropping defense with smart jammer (EDSJ) problem is more challenging. 3) We explore the relationship between the sensor and the jammer. The sensor is aware of the jammer's intelligence and the corresponding best response of the jammer in GCPTS. Based on this knowledge, the sensor tries to obtain an optimal power allocation strategy in order to achieve the maximum value of its own utility. The power allocation problem can be seen as an optimization problem, and the Stackelberg game is applied to model this problem. In our model, the sensor is a leader, while the jammer is a follower. Both of them intend to maximize their utilities and the leader has the priority. For the purpose of achieving the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategies, a stochastic algorithm [15] with feedback (SAF) and a renewed intelligent simulated annealing (RISA) algorithm are proposed. The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we propose two feasible communication models of our system. In Section III, the EDSJ with the single-antenna sensor is discussed. In Section IV, the EDSJ with the multiantenna sensor is investigated. Performance evaluation is given in Section V. The related work is briefly described in Section VI, and we summarize this paper in Section VII. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we consider the transmission process of the transportation state information with feedback in GCPTS. We are interested in the security of this transmission process in the presence of jamming and eavesdropping attacks, so we model two communication systems to study this problem.
A. Communication System Model
In the information transmission process of GCPTS, the sensor sends the transportation state information to the corresponding remote controller, as described in Fig. 2 . The system faces threats of eavesdropping and jamming attacks. With the help of control feedback, the sensor can adjusts its condition according to the received feedback from this controller in order to maximize its secrecy capacity. In addition, we utilize jamming attacks to defend eavesdropping attacks. Without loss of generality, we assume that the time delay of this feedback can be ignored.
We propose the communication model consisting of a transmission channel (i.e., a sensor-controller pair), a jammer, and an eavesdropper. The sensor can set its own transmission power. The channel capacities of the senor-controller channel and the sensor-eavesdropper channel are shown as follows:
where P is the sensor's power and J is the jammer's power. v sc , v jc , v se, and v je are the channel gains of the sensor-controller channel, jammer-controller channel, sensoreavesdropper channel, and jammer-eavesdropper channel, respectively. In addition, W and a indicate the bandwidth and the gain coefficient on the channel, respectively. N is the channel thermal noise. From (1) and (2), the secrecy capacity of this system is given by
where (·)+ = max(·, 0). According to (3), the secure transmission rate of the transportation state information is related to the power of sensor. Since the sensor can adjust its condition with the received feedback from the controller, we assume that the feedback includes the changing flag of security capacity denoted as θ and the power of sensor adjusts its transmission power based on this changing flag. Therefore, we consider a general discrete-time linear power changing process
where k is a positive integer index defined as the system time, P k is the sensor transmission power vector at time k, and θ k is the feedback information from the controller at time k. Note that the sensor adjusts its transmission power with the received θ k , P k +1 is a function denoted as F(·) and related to P k and θ k . As time goes, the secrecy capacity of this system becomes larger and larger and eventually achieves the maximum value. This changing process can be modeled as an SAF. SAF is an iterative optimization approaches and is used in real-time estimation and control problems. In such situation of the description previously, we consider two communication systems, namely, a single-antenna sensor model and a multiantenna sensor model.
Single-antenna model:
We use α and β to represent the per unit power of the sensor and the jammer, respectively. As shown in [16] , we employ the channel capacity as the profit of transmission nodes. The jammer's utility function is calculated as follows:
and the utility function of the sensor is calculated as follows:
where P ≤ P max and J ≤ J max are the system inherent constraints.
In this system, we consider the transmission cost of nodes. Hence, the sensor needs to pay a price to the providers of power. The secrecy capacity is the difference between C and the cost of the source. In addition, the target of the malicious jammer is to disturb the transmission of the sensor, and the cost of the jammer is also considered, so that the utility function of the malicious jammer can be expressed as the difference between the negative of the sensor's channel capacity and the cost of the jammer.
Multiantenna model: Assuming the sensor and the jammer have multiple antennas. The sensor divides the transportation state information into multiple packets to be sent at different antennas. v i sc is the channel gain between the sensor and the controller at antenna i, and v i se is the channel gain between the sensor and the eavesdropper at antenna i. Similarly, v i jc is the channel gain between the jammer and the controller at antenna i, and v i je is the channel gain between the jammer and the eavesdropper at antenna i. Transmission power constraints of the sensor and the jammer are denoted as P max > 0 and J max > 0, respectively. P i is the transmission power at antenna i, and P = (P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n ) denotes the transmission power vector of the sensor. Similarly, J i is the transmission power at antenna i, and J = (J 1 , J 2 , ..., J n ) denotes the power vector of the jammer transmitted. 
βJ i (7) and the sensor's utility function is calculated as follows:
Similar to the single-antenna model, the sensor needs to pay a price to the providers of power. Considering the sensor and the jammer have multiple antennas, the secrecy capacity of this model is the sum of differences between each antenna's conventional secrecy capacity and the cost of each antenna. The utility function of the malicious jammer is the sum of the differences between negative of each antenna's secrecy capacity and the cost of each antenna.
In this paper, the jammer is smart and can choose the optimal transmission strategy with the knowledge of sensor's transmission power to maximize utility. It is applied to strengthen the system security against the eavesdropper. We study how to allocate the power of the sensor transmitted for achieving the maximum utility and model the problem called eavesdropping defense problem with the smart jammer.
B. Oligopoly Market and the Stackelberg Game
This power allocation problem can be modeled as an oligopoly market. Oligopoly market is a definition in economics, consisting of a few sellers (i.e., oligopolists) who can manage the production and sales of a special market, which is defined as transmission power P , J and utility function U (P, J) in this paper. In our system, the sensor and the jammer can be seen as sellers who try to sell their power P and J at a certain price. Since the smart jammer chooses the optimal transmission power strategy J on the basis of the sensor' transmission power P , the sensor is active, while the jammer is passive. Therefore, the Stackelberg game is proposed as an appropriate tool. In the Stackelberg game, the leader chooses its strategy P first and the follower chooses an optimal responding strategy J according to the leader's selection. Because the leader and the follower understand the reaction to each other, both of them intend to maximize their profit and the leader has the priority. By analyzing the interaction of the leader and the follower, we can obtain an SE denoted as P SE , J SE with the optimal strategies of the leader and the follower achieved.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EDSJ UNDER THE SINGLE-ANTENNA MODEL
In this section, the EDSJ with the single antenna is discussed. First, we analyze the jammer's utility function and obtain the optimal relevant strategy with the given strategy of the sensor.
Then, we obtain the optimal strategy of the sensor on the basis of the jammer's optimal responding strategy. In the end, we propose the SAF algorithm to achieve the optimal strategy of the sensor.
A. Analysis of the Jammer (Follower)
Definition 1: Given the utility function of the jammer, we can obtain the optimal power of jammer transmitted figuring out the following optimization problem:
where P denotes the given power strategy of the sensor transmitted and is assumed as a constant in this situation. v sc is the channel gain between the sensor and the controller, and v se is the channel gain between the sensor and the eavesdropper. Similarly, v jc is the channel gain between the jammer and the controller, and v je is the channel gain between the jammer and the eavesdropper. For the purpose of achieving the maximum value of the jammer's utility, (9) is differentiated with respect to J as follows:
(10) By setting (10) as 0, a closed-form solution can be achieved as follows:
where
It is obvious that J(P ) is a continuous function in P . In the following section, we substitute J(P ) into U s (P, J).
B. Analysis of Sensor (Leader)
Definition 2: The sensor knows the jammer's optimal responding strategy and tries to achieve the maximum value of its own utility. We can formulate the corresponding optimization problem as
where J(P ) is given in (11).
By substituting (11) into the utility function of the sensor, we have
Lemma 1: U s (P, J(P )) is a continuous function of P . Proof: From (8), We can achieve that U s is a continuous function of variables (P, J). By (11), it is observed that J(P ) is monotonically increased by P . Therefore, we can achieve that U s (P, J(P )) shows succession in P.
Theorem 1: This is an SE (P SE , J SE ) in the EDSJ and it is the solution to this optimization problem.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we prove the continuity of U s (P, J(P )) in P . As P is continuous, U s (P, J(P )) maximizes its value with a number of point P E ∈ P . To solve this optimization problem, a stochastic algorithm is applied to achieve the best strategy of the sensor. We model the transmission process of the transportation state information as a SAF. The stochastic algorithm is a type of iterative optimization method. In Algorithm 1, SAF generates random variables and converges to an optimal value. The input parameter M is the stable number of the same optimal values. i is the system time and θ i is the feedback flag at time i. The algorithm will achieve the maximum value of U s (P, J) and obtain the SE in the end.
With SE obtained, we can achieve the optimal power of the sensor and the jammer. Then, we can figure out the optimal profit of the sensor denoted as U s , which is the maximum difference between secrecy capacity and the cost of the sensor.
SAF generates random variables and converges to an optimal value. With a random initial power given, we make the power to change randomly. When the feedback is better than the last value, we set this value as a parameter called P best . When the feedback is worse than the last value, we make the power change to an opposite direction. When the feedback is always worse than P best , we obtain the SE in the end.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EDSJ UNDER THE MULTIANTENNA MODEL

A. Analysis of the Jammer (Follower)
Definition 3: With the power allocation strategy of the sensor given as P ∈ P, we can figure out the following optimization problem to achieve the maximum utility of the jammer:
For the purpose of achieving the maximum value of the jammer, we differentiate (15) with respect to J i for i ∈ [1, n] as
Rearranging (16) and setting it to 0, we can obtain the solution as (17) where
We can obtain that J * i (P) in (17) is the best strategy of the jammer antenna i with given P. However, we may notice the limited conditions of J max in this situation. In other words, the optimal strategy J i (P) of the jammer should satisfy the equation that
Then, we consider the other situation n i=1 J * i (P) > J max where the value of ∂J m (P, J)/∂J i is not equal to zero and all antennas of the jammer have their own tendencies. Therefore, we should make them have the same tendencies π in order to obtain a relatively steady state. With setting (16) equal to π, it can be expressed as follows:
By figuring out the above-mentioned equation, we can obtain (19) where
By substituting (19) into constraint conditions, we have
First, let omit the constraints, so there are
For the purpose of satisfying constraints, each J i decreases and π increases correspondingly. When J i is reduced to n i=1 J i < J max , each of J i will have an incentive to increase with positive π. Therefore, the sum n i=1 J i is always equal to J max in this situation. From above, the coefficient π should meet (20) . The approximate solution process is given as Algorithm 2.
B. Analysis of Sensor (Leader)
Definition 4: The optimal responding strategy of the jammer is obtained in the previous section and the sensor knows it. Hence, the utility optimization problem of the sensor is shown as
Lemma 2: When {P[k]} converges to P * (P * ∈ P), we denote J(P*) as the jammer's optimal strategy.
Proof: The given set {P[k]} converges to the P * (P * ∈ P). We assume there is a subset J(P k ) converging to a J = J(P * ). Therefore, the {P[k], J(P[k])} converges to {P * , J }. From the analysis of J(P) in Section V-A, we know that J's optimal strategy is J(P * ). Hence, we can obtain
Then, we define
where γ is any positive number greater than zero. With {P[k]} converging to P * and J(P[k]) converging to J , we have
where K is an integer that is positive and large enough. Hence, when k ≥ K, we have
Note that (28) conflicts with the assumption that J(P * ) is not the optimal strategy of the jammer. Therefore, we prove this lemma.
Theorem 2: The optimal strategy of the sensor P SE exists and the SE as (P SE , J(P SE )) can be obtained. Proof: The continuity of U m (P, J) within the scope of P × J . Considering Lemma 2, J(P) has continuity with P. Therefore, the continuity of U m (P, J(P)) in P has proved. Due to the compact set P, there exists a maximum value of U m (P, J(P)) at a certain point P E ∈ P. Hence, the theorem is proved.
With the existence of an optimal solution, we propose an algorithm called RISA to achieve the optimal strategy of the sensor, shown in Algorithm 3. RISA is a modified simulated annealing, which has a better convergence performance than traditional simulated annealing.
In RISA, the initial temperature is denoted as T > 0, which is high enough. I and J are denoted as the number constraints of P best and P best , respectively. q and p are the stay numbers of P best and P best , respectively. i is the system time and θ i is the feedback flag at time i. P i is the feasible power strategy at time i, and neighbor(P i ) is defined as follows:
. AN is denoted as the accepted number of U temp at the same temperature, and ξ indicates the temperature drop coefficient. When the accepted number of U temp is low, it means that P best will approach to the equilibrium quickly. So, ξ is low and the changing rate of T is becoming fast. On the contrary, the changing rate of T is becoming slow. With the help of AN and ξ, the simulated annealing algorithm can decrease its iterations. When the algorithm is run over, we will achieve the SE of this optimization problem. In this algorithm, we can achieve the optimal profit of the sensor with the SE P best . Then, we obtain the optimal profit of sensor denoted as U m with the SE. Specifically, U m is the maximum secrecy capacity of the sensor in this model.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of our algorithm is validated through simulations and trace experiments. In the simulation analysis, we compare the equilibrium of the proposed EDSJ in different scenarios. In the trace experiment analysis, we collect the traces from deployed experiments in our laboratory and compare the secrecy capacity and the power consumption of our algorithm with those of others via these traces.
A. Simulation Analysis
For the single-antenna model, the noise level N is given as 1, the gain coefficient a is set as 0. We present the changes of the sensor profit U s and the jammer profit J s versus the sensor transmission power P and the jammer transmission power J. Then, we compare the equilibrium of the proposed EDSJ in different scenarios.
1) Random power allocation [17] : The sensor and the jammer both allocate their power randomly. Obviously, the power allocations are feasible. 2) Power allocation without regard to smart jammer (PAWSJ) [14] : The sensor achieves the maximum profit regardless of the existence of the jammer, while the jammer is smart. 3) Power allocation with mistakes (PAM) [18] : The sensor decides its power allocation with the existing smart jammer, while the jammer is a traditional jammer, which transmits interference signal with even power. Kim et al. proposed a random power control approach in [17] . In order to make a comparison with their approaches, the PAWSJ and PAM approaches were shown in [14] and [18] , respectively. We study these papers and employ these approaches to make a comparison with the EDSJ approach.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the results of the single-antenna model. The sensor's profit U s (P, J) and the jammer's profit J s (P, J) are shown as the transmission power of the sensor and the jammer, respectively. It is obvious that with changing P and J, there exists a maximum value of the sensor's profit U s (P, J). As the sensor's power P increases, the jammer's profit J s (P, J) decreases. Meanwhile, as the jammer's power J increases, the jammer's profit J s (P, J) increases at the beginning and then decreases. In this situation, with the assistance of control feedback, the sensor and the jammer will adjust their power P and J to achieve the maximum U s (P, J), as shown in Fig. 3 . Figs. 5 and 6 show the impact of power constraint P max on the profits of the sensor and the jammer under the multiantenna model, respectively. J max is set as 10. When P max increases, the sensor's profits U m (P, J) of these scenarios except PAWSJ increase and the jammer's profits J m (P, J) decrease. In our simulation, RISA achieves the highest sensor's profit. Meanwhile, the jammer's profit of RISA is lower than that of the PAM. PAWSJ is always the worst in both figures.
Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the influence of channel gains v i se on the profits of the sensor and the jammer under the multiantenna 
B. Trace Experiment Analysis
For the trace experiment, we deploy four equipment in the laboratory. Our experimental site is a meeting room and the size of the room is 15 m × 10 m. One D-Link DIR-600M with a single antenna is used as the traffic sensor that transmits information to the remote controller. One desktop computer with a TL-WN725N USB wireless card plays the role of the remote controller to receive the information and is modified as in [35] . The other desktop computer with the TL-WN725N USB wireless card plays the role of the malicious eavesdropper. Both of the computers run Windows 10 operation system and access the traffic sensor router. The other D-Link DIR-600M plays the role of the malicious jammer and transmits jamming signals in the channel, which is the same as the channel of the traffic sensor. We set the jammer and the traffic sensor working in the IEEE802.11n AP mode at 2.4 GHz with 10 MHz bandwidth. Hence, the jammer can interfere the signal transmission of the traffic sensor. The traffic sensor, remote controller, jammer, and eavesdropper are deployed as shown in Fig. 1 . More precisely, the distance of the traffic sensor and the remote controller, the distance of the traffic sensor and the eavesdropper, the distance of the jammer and the remote controller, and the distance of the jammer and the eavesdropper are 5, 10, 15, and 5 m, respectively. The jammer will affect the eavesdropper more than the traffic sensor. We can change the transmission power of the traffic sensor and the jammer in the route setting interface. The transmission rate is achieved as the trace data. The difference between the remote controller's transmission rate and the eavesdropper's transmission rate is the secrecy capacity. Each experiment will last for 1 h and will be repeated thrice to obtain the average value. We compare the result in different models.
1) Common wiretapping model (CWM) [19] : The eavesdropper intercepts the information between the traffic sensor and the remote controller. No jammer exists. 2) Wiretapping model with friendly jammer (WMFJ) [20] :
The main channel applies a friendly jammer to resist the eavesdropper. 3) Wiretapping model with malicious jammer (WMMJ):
The main channel applies a malicious jammer to resist the eavesdropper. Fig. 9 shows the impact of the traffic sensor's power on the secrecy capacity on different models. The secrecy capacity of CWM is always the lowest and the growth range is also the lowest. The secrecy capacity and its increasing level of WMFJ and WMMJ are of little difference. In addition, Fig. 10 shows the power of friendly sides with the same secrecy capacity. The power of WMFJ is much higher than that of WMMJ due to the existence of friendly jammer's power. Hence, WMMJ achieves a relatively high secrecy capacity with less power.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Security in CPTS
In recent years, the CPS security has attracted many interests in recent years. Cá rdenas et al. [21] studied the deception attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The purpose of DoS attacks is to block the information exchange between different parts of the CPS. The purpose of deception attacks is to cheat the systems and make them judge mistakes. Wu et al. [22] proposed a data integrity attack scheme at attacker side. An optimal feedback attack law is presented for maximizing the difference between the output of the attacked system and the secure system.
The security properties of CPTS were studied. Gokhale et al. [23] studied the timeliness and credibility of the control information in intelligent transportation systems. A CPS-based solution was proposed to overcome the physical and cyber interferences in order to improve these two characters. Zhou et al. [24] considered the privacy protection in CPS when the traffic state is collected. In this paper, they proposed a novel scheme that can gather the traffic flow data while protecting the privacy of each vehicle.
B. Jamming and Eavesdropping in the Physical Layer
With the transmission process security studied, the definition of secrecy capacity was applied to the system security. The secrecy capacity was established by Shannon in [25] and extended to the discrete memoryless channel with wiretap channel. With the existence of eavesdropper, some approaches [7] , [9] , [26] were proposed to protect the information security. Zheng et al. [7] proposed a wireless network consisting of a single-antenna source, a multiantenna destination, and a multiantenna eavesdropper. They apply the cooperating full-duplex jammers to improve the secrecy rate in this system. Han et al. [26] considered a wireless transmission channel in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. Multiple friendly jammers are employed to improve the communication security. Considering the interaction between the source and the jammer, a Stackelberg game was studied and the equilibrium was obtained.
In reality, jammers are not always friendly and may act as malicious nodes and this situation was considered in [14] , [27] , and [28] . Yang et al. [14] investigated the wireless networks in the presence of a smart jammer that can disturb the information transmission process. In addition, the jammer is intelligent to adjust its transmitted power for maximizing the effect of damage with knowing source's power. They studied the power control problem as a optimization problem and modeled the problem as a Stackelberg game. The jamming attacks on mobile CPS were studied in [27] . The attacks may degrade the quality of communication and that for mobile CPS were described. Wang et al. [28] applied multiple relays to defend the threat of eavesdropping attacks. In order to maximize the secrecy transmission rate of a channel, three different power control schemes were presented.
C. Analysis With Game Theory
Game theory was applied to study the interactions between intelligent decision makers as an effective approach [29] - [31] . The game-theoretic frameworks that can improve the security of networks were summarized and classified in [32] . Miao et al. [33] selected a system including one controller, one estimator, and one detector from the CPS. A hybrid stochastic game model was proposed to model this system and a moving-horizon approach was presented to solve this game. In the end, they achieve a saddle-point equilibrium as an optimal strategy. Niyato et al. [34] investigated a wireless powered network where the user can submit an energy demand to the energy source for its transmission power. In this system, they consider a malicious node that steals the energy to jam the information transmitted by the user. Then, they propose a game-theoretic model to analyze the relationship between the attacker and the user. They designed an iterative algorithm to obtain the Nash equilibrium of this game.
Different from a previous work, we consider the transmission security of GCPTS with the assistance of feedback in the presence of jamming and eavesdropping attacks. When we try to mitigate the impacts of jamming attacks, the signal of the malicious jammer is used to reduce the wiretap quality of eavesdroppers. In this paper, we propose an eavesdropping attacks defense approach with the help of a malicious jammer. Then, we study how to choose the power allocation of the sensor and the jammer to maximize the secure transmission rate with the control feedback.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the eavesdropping defense issue in the transmission process of the GCPTS with a smart jammer. The relationship between the sensor and the jammer is studied, and jammer's transmission power is proved as a function of the sensor's transmission. The sensor adjusts its transmitted power to obtain the maximum utility with the help of control feedback. Two system models, i.e., a single-antenna model and a multiantenna model, are used to analyze this problem. For both models, the Stackelberg game is applied to formulate this problem, and the existence of equilibrium was proved. SAF and RISA are employed as efficient algorithms to obtain the optimal strategies. We conduct some experiments to validate the performance of our approach. The results match well with the theoretical analysis to demonstrate the correctness.
